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Abstract:
Since the 1980s prominent scholars of European legal integration have used the example of U.S.
constitutionalism to promote a federal vision for the European Community. These scholars,
drawing lessons from developments across the Atlantic, concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court had
played a key role in fostering national integration and market liberalization. They foresaw the
possibility for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to be a catalyst for a similar federal and
constitutional outcome in Europe. The present contribution argues that the scholars who constructed
today’s dominant European constitutional paradigm underemphasized key aspects of the U.S.
constitutional experience, including judgments that favored states’ rights doctrines that buttressed
the social plagues of slavery and laissez faire policies that reinforced economic inequality. This
selective reception of the U.S. experience, bracketing racial subordination and neoliberal policies
under the rubric of states’ rights, propelled European constitutionalism into a neverland—one that
claimed to draw inspiration from U.S. constitutionalism, while simultaneously dismissing as
irrelevant some of its most profound socio-economic challenges. This is important, we argue,
because the dominant European constitutional paradigm not only provides a distorted picture of
U.S. constitutionalism, but also inhibits a deeper understanding of the European one due to its
inability to grapple with racial capitalism, embedded both in its colonial past and its present ECJ
antidiscrimination jurisprudence.
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The Failure to Grapple with Racial Capitalism in European Constitutionalism
Jeffrey Miller1 and Fernanda Nicola2 ©
The paper was written as part of a workshop organized in the framework of the Project IMAGINE,
which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 803163).
Abstract
Since the 1980s prominent scholars of European legal integration have used the example of U.S. constitutionalism to
promote a federal vision for the European Community. These scholars, drawing lessons from developments across the
Atlantic, concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court had played a key role in fostering national integration and market
liberalization. They foresaw the possibility for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to be a catalyst for a similar federal
and constitutional outcome in Europe. The present contribution argues that the scholars who constructed today’s dominant
European constitutional paradigm underemphasized key aspects of the U.S. constitutional experience, including judgments
that favored states’ rights doctrines that buttressed the social plagues of slavery and laissez faire policies that reinforced
economic inequality. This selective reception of the U.S. experience, bracketing racial subordination and neoliberal policies
under the rubric of states’ rights, propelled European constitutionalism into a neverland—one that claimed to draw
inspiration from U.S. constitutionalism, while simultaneously dismissing as irrelevant some of its most profound socioeconomic challenges. This is important, we argue, because the dominant European constitutional paradigm not only provides
a distorted picture of U.S. constitutionalism, but also inhibits a deeper understanding of the European one due to its inability
to grapple with racial capitalism, embedded both in its colonial past and its present ECJ antidiscrimination jurisprudence.
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Introduction
This article provides a critical analysis of EU-U.S. comparative constitutional research. While the
EU-U.S. comparison provided a fertile meeting ground during the Cold War for scholars interested
in questions involving the rule of law, separation of powers, and federalism, it was also a minefield
due to the tainted history of slavery at the heart of the U.S. Constitution.3 At a time when France
and Belgium were still colonial powers, rather than compare the history of slavery in the U.S. with
the history of European colonialism, the founders of the European integration project promoted
the idea of a tabula rasa or “clean slate” narrative after the horrors of the Nazi regime.4 By the 1960s,
scholars viewed the newly-formed European Economic Community as a break from, rather than a
partial continuation of, Nazism, Fascism and colonialism.5

U.S. constitutionalism may have supplied “a common vocabulary for the language of European
integration” and a “conceptual toolbox” to understand the ECJ’s rulings.6 But on the whole,
European legal scholarship has shown a much greater interest in borrowing abstract concepts and
terminology than in studying the less-than-pristine ways in which these concepts have been put to
practical use in the United States. As a result, while U.S. jurists have had to come to terms with the

3

See MICHAEL KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP (2016), and for a more generous reading, SEAN WILENTS, NO

PROPERTY IN MAN (2019).
4

See KAIUS TUORI, EMPIRE OF LAW: NAZI GERMANY, EXILE SCHOLARS AND THE BATTLE FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

1, 8 (forthcoming, 2020) (arguing that legal scholars, especially ones in exile after WWII, “wrote about the Europe of
law as a hope and aspiration, arguing for the language of the rule of law, rights and reason against the language of blood
and culture embraced by the nationalistic and totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany”). See also JAMES WHITMAN,
HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL (2017) (showing how Nazi racial laws has been themselves inspired by American race
laws and racial capitalism).
5

See DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE. THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND

ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS (CHRISTIAN JOERGES AND NAVRAJ SINGH GHALEIGH, EDS. 2003); PEO HANSEN, STEFAN

JONSSON EURAFRICA, THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND COLONIALISM (2014).
6

Giuseppe Martinico, Reading the Others: American Legal Scholars and the Unfolding European Integration, 11 EUR.

JL REFORM 35 (2009).
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concept of racial capitalism7 and with the failure of the separate-but-equal doctrine,8 scholars of
European integration have shied away from tracing the connection of populist movements and
white supremacist ideologies to Europe’s colonial past and capitalist foundations. This is important,
we argue, because only by shedding light on Europe’s history of colonialism and racial
differentiation inherent to capitalism can the project of integration continue towards a more
inclusive, equal, and democratic constitutional settlement.9
Our contribution shows how influential scholars of European legal integration such as Eric Stein, Mauro
Cappelletti, and Joseph H.H. Weiler provided important bridges between the two continents, but also
contributed to the reproduction of a liberal legalist understanding of the evolution of U.S. federal judiciary
power as a neutral one. As a consequence, the dominant European constitutional law paradigm tends to
marginalize the role of U.S. states’ rights movements connected to racial subordination and economic
inequality in the shaping of U.S. federalism. A liberal legalist perspective, which places considerable
confidence in the ability of judges to make wise decisions for the betterment of society,10 tends to
downplay the fact that judicial law-making can lead (and has led) to the protection of slavery, the
endorsement of segregation, and the entrenchment of laissez faire and neoliberal policies—all with the
imprimatur of the U.S. Supreme Court’s judicial review power.11
This shortcoming runs in parallel with European law scholarship’s under-appreciation of the role of
Europe’s colonial past and a failure to grapple with racial capitalist dynamics that reinforced ethnic

7

See OLIVER COX, CASTE, CLASS, & RACE; A STUDY IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS (1948) defining racial antagonism as part of

the class struggle, because it developed within the capitalist system as one of its fundamental traits. Cox explained how:
“Our hypothesis is that racial exploitation and race prejudice developed among Europeans with the rise of capitalism
and nationalism, and that because of the world-wide ramifications of capitalism, all racial antagonisms can be traced to
the policies and attitudes of the leading capitalist people, the white people of Europe and North America.” (Kindle
Locations 8327-8329) and for a full analysis of Cox’s book see
http://www.racismreview.com/blog/2011/12/21/capitalism-and-racism-remembering-the-great-oliver-c-cox/.
8

See NICHOLAS GUYATT, BIND US APART: HOW ENLIGHTENED AMERICANS INVENTED RACIAL SEGREGATION (2019).

9

See AIMEE CESAR, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (1972).

10

See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996).

11

This partial reception of the U.S. constitutional experience in Europe helps to explains why scholars, judges, and civil

servants did not seriously engage with questions of states’ rights, slavery and equal protection jurisprudence in the
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differentiations within the Community.12 While formally ending colonialism, the European founding
fathers were also “securing its continuation”13 by protecting and encasing new trade and investment
regimes between the Community and its former colonies.14 This aspect of the evolution of European law
is incongruent with the image of the Community as a tabula rasa and has received only limited attention
by lawyers. However, after the 2008 financial crisis which led to blaming the “lazy” Greeks and letting
the “ industrious” Germans have a final say on the European Central Bank’s bailouts, the fiction of
eliminating ethnicities in the European Union has instead reinforced new forms of racisms15 and market
hierarchies16 which are well-entrenched in European racial capitalism.17
We do not intend to suggest, implicitly or otherwise, that a closer reading of U.S. legal history would
provide scholars with a clear roadmap out of the EU current legal crises. The U.S. Supreme Court most
certainly has not discovered the “magic bullet” that definitively settles the tension between local and
federal powers, overcomes the legacy of white supremacy, or manages to fully grapple with racial
capitalism.18 Our contention is considerably more modest; namely, that the unvarnished record provides

multi-volume INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (MAURO CAPPELLETTI,
MONICA SECCOMBE AND JOSEPH H. H. WEILER EDS. 1986).
12

CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION (1983) explaining its legacy as “Capitalism

was “racial” not because of some conspiracy to divide workers or justify slavery and dispossession, but because
racialism had already permeated Western feudal society. The first European proletarians were racial subjects (Irish,
Jews, Roma or Gypsies, Slavs, etc.) and they were victims of dispossession (enclosure), colonialism, and slavery within
Europe. Indeed, Robinson suggested that racialization within Europe was very much a colonial process involving
invasion, settlement, expropriation, and racial hierarchy.” Boston Review here
13

See PEO HANSEN, STEFAN JONSSON EURAFRICA, supra note 5 [showing how the project of “Eurafrica” was very
much alive during the Treaty of Rome negotiations] (1955-7).
14

See QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS (2018).

15

See DIMITRY KOCHENOV, CITIZENSHIP (MIT 2019); UGO MATTEI AND LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF

LAW IS ILLEGAL (2008).
16

See Damjan Kukovec, Economic Law, Inequality and Hidden Hierarchies on the EU Internal Market, 38 Michigan

Journal of International Law (2016).
17

See Walter Johnson, To Remake the World Slavery, Racial Capitalism, and Justice from Boston Review (2018)

http://bostonreview.net/forum/walter-johnson-to-remake-the-world.
18

Despite the achievements of the Warren Court against racial discrimination, critical race scholars have provided

important critiques of its Brown legacy. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2005). Today racial discrimination persists, especially against black men that
come into contact with the criminal justice system. See ANGELA DAVIS, POLICING

THE

BLACK MAN: ARREST,
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scholars with more useful insights than the selective version of U.S. constitutionalism that prevails in
much European legal discourse.
In Part I we turn our attention to the reception of U.S. constitutionalism in Europe. The journey begins
with Eric Stein’s contribution to the study of European Community law and narrates how he became,
through his strategic friendship with Michel Gaudet, the director of the Commission’s Legal Services,19
a supporter of expanding the powers of the ECJ. Stein promoted an ambitious judicial constitutional
project for Community law in the footsteps of the Warren Court. Stein’s approach also set aside some of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s most infamous rulings,20 which still haunt the Court to this day.21 Because of

PROSECUTION,

AND IMPRISONMENT

(2019). In the New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander powerfully demonstrated the

pernicious effects of discrimination with respect to laws concerning convicted criminals and the war on drugs. See
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) and how the
U.S. still remains in deep denial of this situation, The Injustice of this Moment is Not an “Aberration” (NYT 17 of January
2020). In a similar way, Paul Butler shows how racial injustice continues to persevere in the criminal justice system. See
PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (The New Press, 2017). Among comparative lawyers, James
Whitman has traced, through an intellectual and sociological history of the concept of dignity, the great disparity between
U.S. and European treatment of criminal offenders, which has resulted in the well-known disenfranchisement of civil
rights and liberties of large numbers of African-Americans. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).This literature shows with piercing
clarity that despite the achievements vis-à-vis anti-discrimination law, the U.S. constitutional experience, especially when
it comes to the criminal justice system, continues to have a disproportionally adverse impact on black lives. See Alicia
Garza, A History of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement, The Feminist Wire. Retrieved October 15, 2015; PATRISSE KHANCULLORS, WHEN THEY CALL YOU A TERRORIST: A BLACK LIVES MATTER MEMOIR (2018).
19

Julie Bailleux, Michel Gaudet a law entrepreneur: the role of the legal service of the European executives

in the invention of EC Law and of the Common Market Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2; COMMON MARKET LAW
REVIEW, pp. 359-367 (2013).
20

See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (In an opinion written by Justice Taney the majority held that “a

negro, whose ancestors were imported into [the U.S.], and sold as slaves,” whether enslaved or free, could not be an
American citizen and therefore did not have standing to sue in federal court.); See also Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (ruling that the evacuation order violated by Korematsu was valid. The majority found that the
Executive Order did not show racial prejudice but rather responded to the strategic military imperative of the
President.).
21

See Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (commonly referred to as the “Travel Ban case”); Robert Tsai, How

Activists Resisted—and Ultimately Overturned—an Unjust Supreme Court Decision, WASHINGTON POST,(Jan. 30,

9
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the deep synergies between states’ rights and segregation policies supported by white supremacist
ideologies in the U.S., Stein’s reluctance to engage with national resistances to federal power in Europe
is perhaps understandable, but it had the consequence of presenting a rather skewed image of U.S.
constitutional law practice.
Part II focuses on the European reception of U.S.-style federal judicial review, and in particular on its
liberal legalist understanding through the influential works of Mauro Cappelletti and Joseph H. H. Weiler.
Because of what Duncan Kennedy calls the ‘legitimation effect,’22 scholars of European integration still
promote judicial review as a neutral instrument in the hands of supranational judges dedicated to the
protection of individual rights and the resolution of quasi-federal conflicts based on institutional
competence arguments rather than the very interests they are contending within it.23 Frequently
underestimated in European legal scholarship are the periods when the U.S. federal judicial power
promoted racial segregation, 24 did not adequately protected minority rights through equal protection
doctrines25 or endorsed freedom of contract to entrench laissez faire policies.26 In the mid-1980s, the
resurgence of states’ rights jurisprudence with the new federalism of the Rehnquist Court altered market

2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/30/how-activists-resisted-ultimately-overturned-an-unjustsupreme-court-decision/?utm_term=.4faf093aa696.
22

DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, FIN DE SIÈCLE) (1997) [explaining how the legitimation effect in

judicial law making is the attitude about social reality that the desirability for radical social change is replaced by a
moderate reformist one.]
23

Id. p. 252 [showing how federalism meant the ‘withdrawal’ of the allocation of federal or state power form the

political discussion].
24

See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) [in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of racial

segregation laws for public facilities as long as these were "separate but equal"].
25

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), [the Supreme Court held that that laws having a racially

discriminatory effect but with a racially discriminatory purpose are valid under the Fourteenth Amendement].
26

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) in which the Supreme Court held that a New York law limiting the

working hours for bakers violated the Fourteen Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
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deregulation through limits to the Commerce Clause.27 This new line of states’ rights jurisprudence was
once again downplayed by European legal scholars focusing on U.S. constitutionalism.28
In Part III, we turn our attention to the consequences of setting aside the aspects of the U.S. federal
experience, such as states’ rights, that were synonymous with racial subordination and the entrenchment
of economic inequalities. In either form, the constitutional doctrines of states’ rights were deemed
irrelevant by scholars of European legal integration due to the fact that the “clean slate” narrative could
overcome racial subordination as ethnic differentiation characterizing the European Community. As
powerfully described in Aimé Cesar’s Discourse on Colonialism, most scholars of European integration have
avoided the obvious comparison between the U.S. legitimation of slavery and the colonial and white
supremacist ideologies at the root of the “Europe of Adenauer, Schuman and Bidault.”29 In this way,
scholars unable to come to terms with racial capitalism could construe a European constitutional utopia
in which the “Echoes of Empire”30 that were present since the Schuman declaration have been
suppressed.31

27

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (holding that the Federal Gun Free Zone Act of 1990 exceeded

Congress’ authority under the commerce clause).
28

See Daniela Caruso, E.U. Law in U.S. Legal Academia, 20 Tulane J. Int’l & Comp. L. 175, 182 (2011) [showing that

the 1990s’ interest of some U.S. constitutionalist scholars in the dynamics of European integration was partly due to the
‘Rehnquist effect’ – i.e. to the fact that Europe’s seemingly apolitical federalism could shield the Rehnquist Court from
its critics.]
29

See AIMEE CESAR, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (1972) p. 37.

30

See ECHOES OF EMPIRE: MEMORY, IDENTITY AND COLONIAL LEGACIES (Kalypso Nicolaidis, Berny Sebe & Gabrielle

Maas eds., 2015).
31

See Peo Hansen & Stefan Jonsson, Euroafrica Incognita: The Colonial Origins of the European Union, History of the

Present, 7 History of the Present, 1, 1–32 (2017).
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I. The Legacy of Eric Stein in Constructing the European Vision of U.S. Constitutionalism
1. Judicial Supremacy: From the Marshall to the Warren Court
We begin with Eric Stein, author of the seminal article, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational
Constitution,32 and the person widely regarded as the main figure responsible for the “leading paradigm on
the nature of European law.”33 In his 1981 essay, Stein argued that the ECJ had interpreted the Founding
treaties “in a constitutional mode rather than employing the traditional international law methodology.”
34

As Boerger has shown in her extensive research, Stein’s life experiences are relevant to his approach

to U.S. constitutional law doctrines and how he applied these concepts to analyze Community law.
Stein was born in 1913 into a Jewish family in Holice, a small town east of Prague, in the then-AustroHungarian Empire. He received a classical civil law education at Charles University in Prague and was
subsequently drafted into the Czech army. He served in the Czech infantry until March 1939, when the
Nazis took control of the country and dissolved the Czech military. Stein fled Czechoslovakia in August
1939 and, after a harrowing journey, arrived in New York at the age of 26. In 1942, with financial
assistance from his relatives, he graduated with a J.D. from the University of Michigan, and then
proceeded to enlist in the U.S. army. In 1946, Stein joined the U.S. State Department’s newly formed
Bureau of the United Nations, where he advised U.S. representatives to the UN General Assembly and
UN Security Council for nine years.
Stein followed the European integration process from its earliest days. His article, The European Coal and
Steel Community: The Beginning of Its Judicial Process, was the first English-language publication on the topic.
In the same year (1955), he joined the faculty of the University of Michigan Law School. As Boerger

32

Eric Stein, Lawyers judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1-27 (1981).
33

Anne Boerger, At the Cradle of Legal Scholarship on the European Union: The Life and Early Work of Eric Stein, 62

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 859, 861 (2014).
34

Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1 (1981).
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explains, Stein’s turn to European law coincided with his dissatisfaction with the potential of international
law to ensure world peace.35
In A Quiet Revolution,36 Weiler, who became a law professor at the University of Michigan “thanks in part
to the unconditional support of Stein”,37 observed that the intellectual voyage from international law to
EC law was typical for the first generation of scholars of European integration.38 The Cold War was an
inauspicious period for the construction of an international legal system. By contrast,
“Community law and the ECJ were everything that an international lawyer could
dream about: The Court was creating a new order of international law in which norms
were norms, sanctions were sanctions, courts were central and frequently used . . .
Community law, as transformed by the ECJ, was an antidote to the international legal
malaise.”39
Stein’s path-breaking re-conceptualization of Community law continues to influence EU legal scholarship
to this day, but his work was by no means neutral or detached. For very understandable reasons, Stein

35

Id. at 869 (“. . . Stein had grown deeply disillusioned by the shortcomings of the United Nations, which by then had

proved incapable of unifying the world under the rule of law. Like others in the immediate postwar years, Stein had
initially embraced his job at the Bureau of the United Nations with some sort of missionary zeal and the hope that the
new organization would prevent conflicts and atrocities similar to ones that had just destroyed his own family. When
the Cold War set in and prevented any progress, he grew increasingly frustrated. As he recalled much later, he was
however ‘not [yet] prepared to accept the idea that law and institutions were irrelevant in the international system.’ As a
result, studying the innovative legal and institutional developments in Europe somehow offered an attractive alternative,
fulfilling both his need to help build a more united world and his tacit but deeply-rooted desire to keep in touch with his
European background.”) (internal citations omitted).
36

Joseph H. H Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors, 26 COMPARATIVE

POLITICAL STUDIES 510–34 (1994).
37

Anne Boerger, At the Cradle of Legal Scholarship on the European Union: The Life and Early Work of Eric Stein, 62

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 859, 889 (2014).
38

The scholarly shift from international law to European Community law was a common route, but not the exclusive

one. The early generation of European Community lawyers also included researchers from the fields of business law,
private international law, and comparative law. Our thanks to Jan Komárek for this helpful comment.
39

Id. at 530–31.
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had a clear vision of what he wanted the Community to become. And for the Community to achieve its
potential as a peace-enhancing alternative to international law, it was essential that the ECJ gain power
over state sovereignty and establish itself as the unquestioned highest authority in its jurisdiction.
Stein’s image of an authoritative and centralized supreme court appears to be heavily influenced by the
nineteenth century jurisprudence of Chief Justice John Marshall.40 In the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,
the Marshall Court established the principle of judicial review, which empowered it to strike down federal
legislation that conflicted with the U.S. Constitution.41 In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled
that a state tax levied on a federal bank incorporated by the government under the Necessary and Proper
Clause was unconstitutional.42 In Martin v. Hunter Lessee,43 Justice Story justified through popular
sovereignty the Supreme Court’s judicial authority to strike down unconstitutional state laws to maintain
national uniformity. In these, and many lesser-known decisions consolidating federal judicial supremacy,44
advocates for states’ rights, thanks to a cautiously interventionist Supreme Court, suffered a series of
setbacks. 45
The philosophy of natural law deeply influenced the drafters of the U.S. Constitution.46 In Federalist 78,
Hamilton provided a very convincing picture of the federal courts as institutions without a “will” and
composed of a body of independent judges, professionally trained with life-tenure appointments. The

40

John Marshall served as the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1801-1835. During Marshall’s tenure, the

power and prestige of the U.S. Supreme Court grew considerably. Today Chief Justice Marshall’s record has been
reconsidered in upholding the institution of slavery, see PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE
NATION’S HIGHEST COURT (2018).
41

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

42

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause, or elastic clause

of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.
43

See Martin v. Hunter Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

44

See Chisholm v. Georgia and Barron v. Baltimore [ Chief Justice Marshall’s cautious attempt to address the nation-

state relationship in favor of a “consolidated national union.” McCloskey p. 22] and for a comparison between this early
SCOTUS jurisprudence and the ECJ see LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE
EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (2001).
46

Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 365–409

(1929).
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Founding Fathers’ emphatic affirmation of the principles of fundamental law gave the Constitution, as
Robert McCloskey put it, its “odor of sanctity” and allowed the Supreme Court to assume a “priestly
mantle.”47 The “least dangerous branch,” according to Hamilton, was exactly what Chief Justice Marshall
was planning to achieve in Marbury v. Madison. In establishing the power of judicial review of the U.S.
Supreme Court, the justices interpreted the U.S. Constitution within the boundaries established by
fundamental law. But in practice, they too carried out their obligations within the boundaries of what
“popular opinion would tolerate.”48 The justices knew very well they could not become completely
detached from what the people would accept.
The other more recent influence on Stein was the legacy of the Warren Court (1953-1969), led by the
progressive former California governor Chief Justice Earl Warren.49 By the time Stein had received his
law degree, the U.S. Supreme Court had long overruled its laissez faire jurisprudence50 and the New Deal
settlement had allowed newly elected justices to grant Congress greater leeway to regulate market
activities, going as far as authorizing federal regulation of wheat grown on a local farm for local
consumption.51 While limiting its judicial scrutiny for individual economic rights,52 in 1938 the Carolene
Products Court, in its famous footnote four, suggested it would undertake more rigorous judicial scrutiny
when the civil liberties or civil rights of minorities were threatened due to an inability to access equal
benefits.53
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HARVARD. L. REV. 5, 122 (2001); see generally, LUCAS A. POWE JR, WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2001)
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When Stein began his career at Michigan Law school, the U.S. Supreme Court “was a Court of gods—
Black, Douglas, Warren—hurling thunderbolts to start our cultural revolutions.”54 In 1954, in Brown v.
Board of Education, Chief Justice Warren famously affirmed, “in the field of public education the doctrine
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”55 In Gideon v. Wainwright, Warren worked hard behind the scenes to
reach another unanimous ruling that required States under the Sixth Amendment to provide the right to
counsel to defendants who were unable to afford a lawyer in criminal cases.56 In Warren’s five to four
Miranda v. Arizona majority opinion, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment required that law
enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during
interrogations while in police custody.57 Finally in 1967, Warren wrote another unanimous opinion, Loving
v. Virginia, that struck down a state law prohibiting inter racial marriage in violation of the Equal
Protection and Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 Such jurisprudence was rightly
praised for rendering illegitimate the prevalent mechanisms and practices of racial discrimination. In
retrospect, critical race scholars like Derrick Bell have shown the failures for black youths of the judicial
integrationist ideal,59 while Sheila Foster pointed out how the notion of “racial agency” was “lost in the
translation of specific claims of racial injustice into abstract constitutional principle.”60
Living, as Stein did, through a period when the Warren Court made marked advances in “the
constitutional guarantee of equality between races, between voters, and between criminal defendants,”61
it is not surprising that he invested much of his considerable intellectual and organizational talents in
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pursuit of the “constitutionalization” of European Community law and the expansion of judicial
supremacy while omitting the tainted history of the states’ rights and popular sovereignty jurisprudence.62

2. Stein’s Strategic Omission of States’ Rights
The delegates who drafted the U.S. Constitution are often celebrated for producing a document that
managed to win the support of a diverse group of states and statesmen, but as McCloskey memorably
puts it: “this congenial result had been achieved not only by compromise but by forbearance.”63 Indeed,
the U.S. Constitution was so open-ended that genuine uncertainty existed in 1790 as to whether the
document had created a league of sovereign states or a new nation. As states’ rights advocates repeatedly
stressed from the period of the Marshall Court onward, had the Founding Fathers intended for the U.S.
Supreme Court to wield a tool as powerful as judicial review, it is odd that they should have granted it in
such an oblique manner, rather than forthrightly.64
In truth, the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings on the relationship between federal and state powers are noncoherent, and they remain politically contested to this day. Legal historians have highlighted how
ideological shifts discernable in U.S. constitutionalism tilt it either in favor of a federal plenary power or
in favor of states’ rights. Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of Independence,65
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who was deeply influenced by the French revolutionary experience, was the period’s foremost advocate
for popular sovereignty. For Jefferson, the states provided the most effective safeguard of the nation’s
freedoms and self-rule, and the U.S. Supreme Court had shamelessly exceeded its mandate. When the
U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793),66 that for the purposes of the Union, “Georgia
is not a sovereign state,” Congress promptly passed the XI Amendment, which overrode the Court’s
ruling and placed the states on a stronger footing vis-à-vis the federal courts.67 Popular sovereignty acted
at the same time as a source of legitimacy and a counterweight to judicial governance.
Surely Stein was well aware of this, but his work hardly explored the Jeffersonian perspective. As Boerger
shows, Stein’s Bellagio grant to study the role of courts in building common markets became
controversial because the “undertaking clearly bore a political overtone.”68 Even Stein’s friend and wellknown comparative law scholar, Otto Kahn-Freund, began to doubt the scientific method behind Stein’s
project, which aimed to demonstrate how the highest courts in both the U.S. and Europe represented
the most “federalist constitutional organ.”69 In highlighting the correspondence between these two
scholars, Boerger shows that Khan-Freund was worried that Stein would dismiss too easily the
“centrifugal forces, the resistances, the great power and the strong case of our ‘Jeffersonian’ of 1979.”70
Indeed, the work of the new European legal historians71 has shed light on Jeffersonian attitudes in Europe
through national resistances to European legal integration and to ECJ judicial governance, emanating not
only from domestic courts, but also from executive branches of governments, diplomatic circles and the

removed and he “went to his grave believing that Marshall and his colleagues on the Supreme Court were evil, a gang . .
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media.72 For instance, historians have traced the resistance of the Gaullistes in France at odds with
Christian Democratic politicians such a Jacques Delors73 in their attempt to limit preliminary references
to the ECJ.74 In 1979 the National Assembly had to intervene to require domestic courts to accept the
hierarchy of EC law over French national law.75 In the Italian and German realms, the resistance was
prominent in the early 1970s, spearheaded by Constitutional Court decisions such as Frontini76 and
Solange,77 which asserted the predominance of domestic courts as the ultimate defenders of fundamental
rights.
It might be a stretch to equate U.S. popular sovereignty and the states’ rights jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court to the early national resistances in EU law. The latter were triggered by national
constitutional courts seeking to affirm the relevance of fundamental rights against the ECJ78 and by
domestic judiciaries revamping their national legal traditions.79 Nevertheless, it appears reasonably clear
that Stein was not eager to recognize the legitimacy of the early opposition expressed by political and
legal elites to the creation of a supranational legal order.80
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II.

Mauro Cappelletti and Joseph Weiler’s Vision of Judicial Review

Part II engages with the contributions of Mauro Cappelletti and Joseph H. H. Weiler to the European
image of U.S.-style judicial review. We argue that, in a manner analogous to Stein, who advocated for
ECJ supremacy and downplayed U.S. states’ rights movements, Cappelletti and Weiler exported to
Europe a judicial review utopia—one which drew on the U.S. experience, but side-stepped the political
explosiveness that has regularly beset U.S. Supreme Court judicial review in practice. By deploying the
fiction of judicial neutrality, European law scholars advanced a more attractive blueprint for European
legal integration than the U.S. historical record actually offered.

1. Neutral Judicial Review as Liberal Legalism

In 1971, Cappelletti published Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, a short but highly influential book
that traced the spread of judicial review from the United States to much of the rest of the world.81
Through his book and later publications, Cappelletti presented judicial review as the ultimate safeguard
of fundamental values against majoritarian political institutions.82 In a recent publication that builds on
and extends Cappelletti’s work, Doreen Lustig and Weiler observe that Cappelletti viewed judicial review
as an “unqualified public good”83 and courts “as the most efficient guarantee for the effectiveness and
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enforcement of” individual rights and liberties.84 In Cappelletti’s view, the revival of judicial review in
Europe was a logical reaction to fascism and World War II, which “demonstrated the horrendous
potential for tyranny, even majority tyranny, of governments not subject to constitutional restraint”.85
Cappelletti readily acknowledged that judicial review was not implemented in the same way in every
country, but he identified a cross-European consensus that unchecked parliamentary sovereignty had the
potential to pose an existential threat to democratic governance.
Cappelletti was not only a proponent of judicial review in general terms. He also made it quite clear that
he saw the ECJ, rather than the Member State courts, as the proper institution to entrust “the ultimate
judicial authority in the Community as regards questions of fundamental rights”.86 In The Transformation
of Europe, Weiler weaves a complementary theme into his own work, asserting that the
constitutionalization of EU law was undoubtedly aided by “that deep-seated legitimacy that derives from
the mythical neutrality and religious-like authority with which we invest our supreme courts”.87 Faith in
the power of judicial review as a superior arbiter defending individual rights or solving institutional
conflicts without engaging with the underlying political economy and racial capitalism goes hand-in-glove
with faith in the ability of judges to make rulings in a fair and impartial manner.
US legal realism has revealed the untold implications and ideologies disguised under liberal legalism in the
rulings handed down during the Gilded Age by a Supreme Court that benefited property owners and
business elites united by a common laissez-faire ideology.88 Due to its low legitimacy in the aftermath of
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Dred Scott,89 the Supreme Court focused strictly on questions of economic control rather than racial
emancipation while endorsing liberal legalism and its abstract legal reasoning. As early as 1873 in the
Slaughter-House Cases,90 the plaintiffs’ lawyers made a creative argument using the XIV Amendment, which
was intended to eliminate racial subordination, to instead protect any person against State laws that would
“deprive any person of life, liberty and property, without due process of law.”91 The U.S. Supreme Court
gradually accepted the liberal notion that liberty of contract was enforceable as an individual right under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.92 A few years later, the U.S. Supreme Court was
ready to interpret the notion of freedom of contract as derived directly from Herbert Spencer.93 The
Court reached the apex of its laissez faire jurisprudence in Lochner v. New York, which held that the freedom
of contract was under substantive due process a limit to the valid exercise of states’ police powers.94
Justice Oliver W. Holmes’s dissent rejected the notion of freedom of contract as a displacement of the
basic notion that states had the power to regulate the economy. Instead he famously explained that the
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Constitution should not embody any particular economic theory nor that general propositions should
decide concrete case. 95
In his review essay, Why read The Transformation of Europe today?, Komárek expresses skepticism about
Weiler’s characterization of European courts as catalysts for change. For Komárek, Transformation is an
article “about Europe”, but “embedded in the American culture of liberal legalism that had been
dominant at law schools in the United States until the mid-1980s”. In particular, it “exhibits the trust in
courts (especially the ECJ) similar to that of [American] legal liberals”. 96This proposition led Weiler to
overestimate the transformative power of European courts as detached from the socio-economic
struggles dividing the Community along the North-South and later on, the East-West cleavage.
Far from playing an “exalted role” in the integration of EU law, Komárek argues that the European
courts of the 1960s and 1970s were nothing more than institutional players, engaged in mundane,
bureaucratic tasks: “There was nothing mystical or religious about them”, he concludes. While we agree
with Komarek’s view, our task is to stress how Weiler’s communitarian philosophy, focusing on popular
sovereignty and the lack of a European demos, was struggling with figuring out ways for a Community
as legitimated by its people.97 Living in the U.S. under the legacy of the Rehnquist Court, Weiler was not
committed, as Stein was, to the form of U.S. constitutional law interpretation that was espoused by “his”
U.S. Supreme Court. To the contrary, he distanced himself from the Rehnquist Court and avoided
reference to contemporary state rights’ doctrines when he addressed U.S.-style judicial federalism.

2. Downplaying the State Rights’ Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court
Indeed, during the time period when Weiler was invoking a liberal legalist image of the ECJ and judicial
federalism as a way to resolve institutional competence conflicts without engaging with the underlying
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political economy implications of federal adjudication, the Rehnquist Court was transforming U.S.
federalism. The Rehnquist court was reinterpreting states’ rights in ways that were strongly opposed by
liberals and praised by conservatives also looking at Europe as a model for states’ rights.98 In the same
year that Weiler published Transformation, David Day described the U.S. Supreme Court in unabashedly
political terms:
[T]he concept of federalism is a major doctrinal concern of the Rehnquist Court.
After all, on the political level federalism has had close attachment to the Republican
party and its recent domination of the Presidency. On the level of judicial doctrine,
the modern federalism concept has provided a supportable and convenient vehicle
for the conservative retrenchment of various constitutional doctrines.99
The Rehnquist Court used its power of judicial review to strike down a federal law designed to regulate
gun possession in school zones,100 concluded that the federal government could not compel State officers
to administer background checks on prospective handgun owners,101 and ruled unconstitutional a law
that provided a federal civil remedy for gender-based violence, arguing that Congress’ act threatened “to
completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority . . . ”102.
As scholars of U.S. constitutional law and EU law, the most glaring omission we find in most European
legal scholarship on U.S.-style judicial review are the many instances when U.S. courts failed to protect
minorities from the tyranny of the majority. The U.S. Supreme Court has suffered its fair share of crises
of legitimacy, many of which have been precipitated by controversial judgments involving race relations
and state rights. The Dred Scott Court endorsed slavery, the Plessy Court sided with racial segregationists
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and white supremacy ideology. These, and other decisions that comprise the so-called “anti-canon” of
U.S. constitutional law, will remain blights on the institution for as long as it exists. To take just one
particularly egregious example, consider Dred Scott, which is broadly understood among U.S.
constitutional scholars and political scientists as the nadir of the U.S. Supreme Court’s legitimacy.103 The
legacy of Dred Scott legacy still haunts the Court to this days. In Obergefell v. Hodges,104 the Court held that
the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts accused
the majority of failing to uphold the principle of judicial restraint, leaving such decisions to the legislative
branch or to the states, just as it had failed, with disastrous consequences, in Dred Scott.
Legitimacy is a precious commodity for the “least dangerous branch”.105 Its independence is precarious—
contingent on the support, or at a minimum, the assent, of the public and the other branches. It is also
fallible in entrenching economic inequalities and failing to grapple with racial capitalism. At times it has
risen to the occasion, boldly protecting minority rights and fundamental values, but such task depending
on the judicial elites in power and the socio-economic struggles has not always proved capable of carrying
out the august role that Cappelletti and Weiler have assigned to judicial review.

III.

The Adverse Consequences of Europe’s Dominant Constitutional Paradigm

The failure to grapple with racial capitalism as racial differentiation and subordination in capitalist
societies created an inadequate framework to address Europe’s post-war colonial legacy. Indeed, such a
reckoning was to European politicians and scholars alike, almost antithetical to the axiomatic fiction that
Community law was created from a tabula rasa after World War II. In truth, Europe’s economy was solidly
grounded in racial capitalism—the notion that racial differentiation would start in the West where the
fabrication of whiteness began at the same time that capitalism emerged so that the two produced “racial
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capitalism”, a system able to justify slavery, violence and imperialism.106 This is because, as Cedric J.
Robison explains, at the very same times that European labor was “herded into a newly formed industrial
order,” African labor was globalized by the slave trade and incorporated in modern forms of production
through racial subordination and exploitation.107

1. The Suppression of Racial Capitalism in European Constitutionalism
International lawyers have shown how racial capitalism allowed the Spanish crown to appropriate and
sell Africans though the Atlantic slave trade.108 The literature produced by radical black Marxists since
the 1950s is abundant and re-tells a story of the industrial revolution and the rise of nineteenth century
bourgeoisie through the lens of racial capitalism.109 More recently legal historians have carefully shown
how the wealth accumulated through slave labor in cotton and tobacco industries during the industrial
revolution was capitalized and securitized in the New York and London stock exchanges.110
But rather than view this process as racial capitalism, the European founding fathers addressed it as part
of their strategy to promote African economic development. The Schuman declaration of May 9, 1950,
the founding document of the Coal and Steel Community, ends not only with the need to secure peace
but also with the following sentence:
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“With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one
of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent.”111
Rather than openly engaging with racial capitalism as a central reason for the exploitation of the African
continent, the notion of how Europe should contribute to “African development” remerges today in the
Commission’s Trade for All agenda.112 The document effectively dismisses racial capitalism and the trade
and migration effects of its colonial legacy.113 The newly formed Commission committed to promoting
a European Way of Life appears unprepared to acknowledge Europe’s role in promoting racial capitalism
and its link to the rise of right-wing populist leaders with xenophobic traits in Hungary, Poland and
Italy.114 The idea that Europe’s colonial past justifies more generous migratory policies or redistribution
through trade agreements with Europe’s former colonies enjoys little to no political support. To the
extent that race remains on the agenda, politicians and scholars confine it, implicitly, to trade
agreements115 and policies to address illegal immigrants at the borders.116
The relationship between racial structures and the accumulation of wealth and power in Europe attracts
relatively little attention in European law scholarship as well. The few exceptions include Eddie BruceJones, who has linked institutional racisms to Europe’s colonial past,117 Iyiola Solanke, who has traced
the deeper psychological roots of racial discrimination to theories of stigma,118 and scholarship that has
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shown how racism and ethnic differentiation are deeply entrenched in Europe’s treatment and
stereotyping of Roma population throughout the Union.119 Approaching the topic from a comparative
perspective, some scholars have noticed how Critical Race Theory, which has blossomed in U.S. law
schools since the 1980s, has faced stiff resistance in European law scholarship. Mathias Möschel has
linked this outcome in European scholarship to a “double displacement” entailing the fact that the
colonies remain outside the European territory and that racism, in the form of antisemitism, has been
formally outlawed in the continent since the Holocaust.120 At the formal level, antisemitism is harshly
rejected by governments and constitutional courts, yet the resurgence of antisemitism, racism and
xenophobia in Europe is on the rise, especially fueled against Roma, immigrants, and non-white
individuals.

2. Shortcomings of EU Anti-Racist Legislation
In 2000, the EU adopted its first piece of anti-racist legislation: Directive 2000/43, 121 commonly known
as the Race Equality Directive. It prohibits discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin, in, among
other areas, employment and access to goods and services. Shortly thereafter, the EU adopted a second
piece of legislation, Directive 2000/78, 122 also known as the Employment Equality Directive. This
directive extends anti-discrimination protections to more grounds—religion or belief, disability, age and
sexual orientation—but applies only to the field of employment.
Among the protected grounds covered under EU law, race discrimination was the primary concern of
EU legislators. In fact, it is probably not an overstatement to say that the fate of anti-racist legislation was a prerequisite
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for EU legislation covering all other grounds. Most accounts of the origins of Directive 2000/78 describe it as
“riding in the wake” or “on the coattails” of the momentum produced by the Race Equality Directive.
And yet, since the adoption of the Race Equality Directive only three judgments that address racial
discrimination have reached the ECJ.123 Despite advances in many of the other “new” grounds,124 there
appears to be an unwillingness or inability to enlist domestic courts to refer questions to the ECJ on race.
Early on, scholars like Daniela Caruso pointed out the limits of positive action in the EU due to historical
and conceptual underpinnings of the myth of identity blindness, especially in French Law.125 More
recently, Mathilde Cohen’s interview-based study of the French judiciary strongly suggests that many
French public officials are wary of even entertaining the possibility that race could play a role in how
individuals are treated in society.126 It is not difficult to imagine why the Race Equality Directive would
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be rarely invoked before a judiciary that “not only refuse[s] to name races and ethnicities, but also denie[s]
the legitimacy of these categories.” 127
Two recent rulings, Achbita,128 and the case that joined to it, Bougnaoui,129 illustrate the reluctance of the
ECJ to confront racial discrimination head-on. In fairness to the court, neither case was brought as race
discrimination case, although they certainly could have become one without too much interpretative
stretch.130 Achbita involved a Muslim woman who was instructed not to wear a hijab (headscarf) because
it violated the employer’s neutrality policy. The ECJ sided with the employer, ruling that its interest
outweighed Achbita’s. As AG Kokott forthrightly stated in the introduction to her opinion, the case
came before the court during difficult times:
There is no need to highlight here the social sensitivity inherent in this issue,
particularly in the current political and social context in which Europe is confronted
with an arguably unprecedented influx of third-country migrants and the question of
how best to integrate persons from a migrant background is the subject of intense
debate in all quarters.131
It is heavily disputed whether the Court struck the correct balance in the current political climate between
the defendant-business’s interest in a secular workplace and Achbita’s freedom of religious.132 Less
frequently discussed, but we think equally worthy of consideration, are the factors that led the plaintiffs
to avoid framing the legal matter in terms of race discrimination.133
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Conclusion
We share Matej Avbelj’s intuition that the partial reception of U.S. constitutionalism has misled
scholarship on European legal integration.134 At crucial moments in the intellectual history of EU law,
this partial reception served a strategic purpose for scholars of legal integration. It provided the
conceptual framework they needed to promote European constitutionalism, buttressed by an ostensibly
politically neutral, supranational judicial review power for the ECJ. In Stein’s scheme, reflecting on the
successful legacy of the Warren court,135 U.S. constitutionalism was a promising model to strengthen the
Community’s supranational constitutional project. In the works of Weiler and Cappelletti, judicial review
became a normatively appealing and politically neutral legal tool of federal integration that ignored the
near-concurrent revamping of states’ rights under the Rehnquist Court. But this partial reception also
underplayed the United States’ politically contested judicial history and its roots in racial capitalism.136
In European law scholarship the comparison with a “U.S.-inspired constitutionalism” has often been
deployed as an ahistorical and liberal legalist narrative of judicial review and federalism that has been
molded to fit integrationist agendas.137 This selective reception of U.S. constitutionalism has set aside
national resistances, created self-defeating expectations and most importantly blunted the legal tools
necessary to address racial subordination and economic exploitation in EU law.
Today it is especially important to foreground the darker legacies of U.S. constitutionalism and their
many analogues in EU law instead of expelling them from the European constitutional heritage.138 The
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project of European legal integration is now more important than ever, but it will not survive unless it
confronts its own structural flaws. “Fortress Europe” has created deep inequalities in the EU-African
trade relationship, and these economic inequalities have returned to haunt Europe with unstoppable
migratory fluxes. Market integration, as enforced by the ECJ in the name of free movement, has produced
ambivalent distributive effects.139 And the EU’s management of the sovereign debt crisis since 2010 has
seriously undermined certain states’ ability to sustain social safety-nets,140 and duly receive migrants.141 In
crafting a new constitutional paradigm, lawyers, judges, and scholars must now be especially wary of
apolitical comparison without underlying socio-economic and racial capitalism implications.
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